# RELIABLE OPERATING SYSTEMS

# **Research Summary**

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
#### PERCEIVED PROBLEMS

- Weak security and <u>reliability</u>
  - Computer crashes
  - Digital pests (viruses, worms, etc.)

# Complexity

- Hard to maintain and configure
- Too large for embedded and mobile computing

## **TYPICAL OS STRUCTURES**



## **INHERENT PROPERTIES**

# Fundamental design flaws in monolithic kernels


- All code runs at highest privilege level (breaches POLA)
- No proper fault isolation (any bug can be fatal)
- Huge amount of code *in* kernel (1-20 bugs per 1000 LOC)
- Untrusted, 3<sup>rd</sup> party code in kernel (70% driver bugs)
- Hard to maintain and configure (limited portability)

# Lack of modularity causes problems

- Proper OS design can solve above problems



## **DESIGN OF A RELIABLE OS: MINIX 3**



Minimal kernel

Recent work

- Design and implementation of the MINIX 3 operating system
- Transformation into a minimal kernel design (< 3800 LOC)</li>
- All servers and drivers run in a separate user-mode process

#### Current research

Additional reliability properties

## **MINIX 3: ACHIEVING RELIABILITY**

# Design principles

- Simplicity
- Modularity
- Least authorization
- Fault tolerance

# How this helps

- Number of fatal bugs is reduced
- Damage that bugs can do is limited
- Recovery from common failures is possible




## **MINIX 3: STRUCTURAL MEASURES**

- Stable minimal kernel (< 3800 LOC) reduces # fatal bugs</li>
- Isolated, user-mode processes in private address space
- Reliable IPC: small, fixed-size message passing
- Deadlock avoidance and deadlock detection
- Buffer overruns prevented and damage limited
- Bad pointers in OS are caught with MMU hardware
- Scheduler detects and tames infinite loops in OS
- Monitor and restart malfunctioning OS services

## **MINIX 3: PER-PROCESS POLICIES**

- IPC only possible if type and target are allowed
- Only exported list of kernel calls can be called
- Access to individual I/O ports can be restricted
- Access to remote memory, e.g., video RAM
- Scheduling priority and quantum size
- Period for reincarnation server status checks

## **MINIX 3: REINCARNATION SERVER**



#### Start servers and drivers

- (1) Encapsulate in new process
- (2) Assign only needed privileges
- (3) Start in controlled environment

#### Monitor services

- (a) Immediate crash detection
- (b) Periodically check status

# Fix problems

- Kill and restart fresh copy

## **SUMMARY & CONCLUSION**

- Different OS structures and properties
  - Fundamental problems with monolithic systems
  - Inherent benefits of modular systems
- OS reliability is possible: MINIX 3
  - Multiserver OS with minimal kernel (< 3800 LOC)</li>
  - Improvements over other operating systems
    - We reduce the number of fatal bugs
    - We limit the damage bugs can do
    - We can recover from common failures

## **QUESTIONS?**

#### The MINIX 3 team

- Jorrit Herder
- Ben Gras
- Philip Homburg
- Herbert Bos
- Andy Tanenbaum

#### More information

- Web: www.minix3.org
  - As of tomorrow!
- News: comp.os.minix
- Mail: jnherder@cs.vu.nl



## **PERFORMANCE ISSUES**

- Historical fear: modularity incurs overhead
  - Communication overhead
  - Copying of data
- Times have changed ...
  - New insights reduced performance penalty (only 5-10%)
  - Absolute performance penalty is minimal these days
  - Users gladly sacrifice some performance for reliability

## **MINIX 3: SOME NUMBERS**

#### Performance measurements

- Time from multiboot monitor to login is under 5 sec.
- The system can do a full build of itself within 4 sec.
- Run times for typical applications: 6% overhead
- File system and disk I/O performance: 9% overhead
- Networking performance: Ethernet at full speed

#### Code size statistics

- Kernel is 3800 LOC; rest of the OS is in user space
- Minimal POSIX-conformant system is 18,000 LOC